| Abstract | Monetarna politika je vrlo bitan instrument makroekonomske politike kojim država ostvaruje
makroekonomske ciljeve. Za provođenje monetarne politike zadužene su središnje (narodne)
banke koje pored provođenja monetarne politike imaju i funkciju emisije novca i očuvanja
njegove stabilnosti. Osnovni zadatak i suština monetarne politike jedne zemlje je reguliranje
optimalne količine novca u opticaju, dok su glavni ciljevi koji se postavljaju pred monetarnu
politiku ekonomska likvidnost, monetarna ravnoteža te stabilnost domaćeg novca i deviznog
tečaja.
Monetarnu politiku Bosne i Hercegovine, koja je regulirana Zakonom o Centralnoj banci Bosne
i Hercegovine, provodi Centralna banka Bosne i Hercegovine koja je organizirana po sustavu
valutnog odbora te funkcionira u skladu sa pasivnom monetarnom politikom i nema
diskrecijskih ovlasti kao uobičajena središnja banka.
Cilj rada je istražiti je li uvođenje modela valutnog odbora u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo
opravdano. S obzirom da je Bosna i Hercegovina izišla iz rata sa gospodarskim potencijalom
dvadesetak posto prijeratnog, na nejedinstvo ekonomskog prostora, visoke političke tenzije, s
ograničenim iskustvom poslovanja središnje banke, uvođenje valutnog odbora kao modela
upravljanja monetarnom politikom se nametalo kao logično pa i jedino moguće u spomenutim
okolnostima.
Usporedbom osnovnih ekonomskih pokazatelja sa susjednim zemljama Hrvatskom i Srbijom
koje imaju različite režime deviznih tečajeva, te Bugarskom, gdje je Bugarska narodna banka
također organizirana po modelu valutnog odbora s nešto većim diskrecijskim ovlastima nego
Centralna banka Bosne i Hercegovine, a koristeći metode analize, komparacije te statističke
funkcije, vidljivo je da Bosna i Hercegovina ima najlošije pokazatelje, što upućuje da Bosna i
Hercegovina treba težiti prema modifikaciji sustava valutnog odbora kao prijelaznom rješenju,
odnosno povećanju diskrecijskih ovlasti središnje banke, slično kao u Bugarskoj, a zbog
opredijeljenosti prema Europskoj uniji rješenje monetarne politike treba tražiti u Eurosustavu
nakon ispunjenja kriterija konvergencije iz Maastrichta. |
| Abstract (english) | Monetary policy is a very important instrument of macroeconomic policy by which the state
achieves macroeconomic goals. Central (national) banks are in charge of implementing
monetary policy, which, in addition to implementing monetary policy, also have the function
of issuing money and preserving its stability. The basic task and essence of a country's
monetary policy is to regulate the optimal amount of money in circulation, while the main goals
set before monetary policy are economic liquidity, monetary balance and stability of the
domestic currency and exchange rate.
The monetary policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is regulated by the Law on the Central
Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is implemented by the Central Bank of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is organized according to the currency board system, which functions
according to the rules of passive monetary policy and does not have discretionary rights like a
typical central bank.
The aim of the paper is to investigate whether the introduction of the currency board model in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was justified. Considering that Bosnia and Herzegovina came out of
the war with an economic potential of about twenty percent of the pre-war level, the disunity
of the economic space, high political tensions, and limited experience of the central bank, the
introduction of the currency board as a model of monetary policy management was imposed
as logical and even the only possible in the mentioned circumstances.
By comparing the basic economic indicators with neighboring countries Croatia and Serbia,
which have different exchange rate regimes, and Bulgaria, where the Bulgarian National Bank
is also organized according to the model of a currency board with somewhat greater
discretionary powers than the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, using methods of
analysis, comparison and statistical functions, it is evident that Bosnia and Herzegovina has
the worst indicators, which indicates that Bosnia and Herzegovina should strive towards the
modification of the currency board system as a transitional solution, i.e. increasing the
discretionary powers of the central bank, similar to Bulgaria, and due to its commitment to the
European Union, a monetary policy solution should be sought in the Eurosystem after meeting
the Maastricht convergence criteria. |
